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EFFECTIVE TAX RATES: FACT
OR FANCY?
BORIS I. BITTKER'
I. INTRODUCTION
For at least twenty-five years, tax commentators have
pointed out that the Internal Revenue Code's rate schedules,
which now start with a rate of 14 percent and rise to a top rate of
70 percent, are misleading. One source of confusion is the
difference between the marginal rate applicable to a taxpayer's
final dollar of taxable income and the average rate applicable to
his taxable income as a whole.' A married couple with $20,000 of
taxable income, for example, is subject to a rate of 14 percent on
their first $1,000 and to gradually increasing rates on additional
increments to their income, until a rate of 28 percent is reached
on their last $4,000 of taxable income. But their actual tax
liability is $4,380, or about 22 percent of their taxable income of
$20,000.
This difference between marginal and average rates is not
the only source of confusion. Taxable income is the statutory tax
base to which the statutory rates are applied, but it is not the only
measure of the taxpayer's economic well-being. The couple just
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' See, e.g., R. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITiy 269-70 (1947):
In bemoaning high taxes, taxpayers commonly talk in terms of marginal rates,
or the upper end of the rate schedule to which they are subject. Except in the
very high brackets [however] actual average rates, or effective rates, are much
lower than marginal rates because of graduation and personal exemptions....
Under 1945 law people who are subject to withholding think of their tax rate as
19 percent and people fortunate enough to be in the top bracket think of their
tax as 86.45 percent. They would be happier and more accurate if they learned
to think in terms of effective rates.
As will be seen, this early acknowledgment that the income tax's bark is worse than its bite
melds together two different points: (1) the taxpayer's average rate, no matter what
income base it is computed on, is lower than his top marginal rate on that base; and (2)
the average rate is higher when computed on the statutory base ("taxable income") than
when computed on a more comprehensive base.
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described, for example, may have received $25,000 of gross
income from wages and investments, from which $5,000 was
deducted to reflect their personal and dependency exemptions
and optional standard deduction, leaving taxable income of
$20,000. Expressed as a fraction of gross, rather than taxable,
income, their average rate of tax is only about 19 percent
($4,380/$25,000). A further inquiry into their financial affairs
might disclose some economic benefits that were exempt from
tax and hence omitted from their tax return, such as tax-exempt
interest,2 a bequest,3 or the rental value of occupying their
personal residence.4 If these exempt items were worth $10,000,
the couple could be described as enjoying $35,000 of economic
income. When their actual tax liability of $4,380 is computed in
relation to this amount, the average rate drops to about 12.5
percent ($4,380/$35,000).
Another calculation that is sometimes of interest is the tax
that would be payable if the statutory rates were applied to either
the couple's gross income of $25,000 or their economic income
of $35,000, rather than to the taxable income base ($20,000) that
is actually specified by the Internal Revenue Code. This
hypothetical liability is $6,020 if the statutory rates are applied to
the alternative tax base of $25,000 and $9,920 if the alternative
base is $35,000, resulting in hypothetical average rates of about
24 and 28 percent of these alternative bases. Finally, the same
couple's aggregate federal, state and local tax burden may be
estimated and expressed as a fraction of their taxable income,
gross income, or economic income, resulting in an average rate
of total taxes for each of these bases.
When the taxpayer's actual income tax liability is expressed
as a fraction of a base other than taxable income, the resulting
percentage is usually described as the "effective rate." This label
can be applied, for example, to both the 19 percent and the 12.5
percent rates in the illustration above. In computing effective tax
rates, the tax theorist's objective may be merely to describe the
economic impact of the tax, but often such a computation is the
predicate for a criticism of existing law and a proposal for
change. In polemical literature, for example, the difference
between an effective rate of 19 or 12.5 percent on the couple
described above and the 28 percent rate that would result if the
statutory rate schedule were applied to their economic income of
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103.
3 Id. § 102.
4 Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1934).
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$35,000 may be assailed as a "gap," reminiscent of the missile
and credibility gaps of recent political life, that ought to be
closed.
There are, however, many different ways to compute effec-
tive tax rates, generating-despite occasional references to the
"true" or "actual" rate-as many computations as there are
commentators. The resulting confusion can be illustrated by
reference to the leading college text on economics, 5 which con-
tains a table to show "just how progressive the personal income
tax really is," with average rates running up to 69.7 percent. A
few paragraphs later, however, the reader is informed that these
rates exist only "on paper," and that before the Tax Reform Act
of 1969," the effective rate on taxpayers with incomes over
$1,000,000 was not the amount set out in the table, but only 48.2
percent. This rate, in turn, is then described as "an overstate-
ment if one takes account of many true income items that could
be treated as low-taxed capital gains."7 The rates vary in this
exposition because the author uses the same dollar amount of
tax liability but three different tax bases in making his calcula-
tions. A similar shift from one tax base to another explains why
the effective rates in a table entitled "Individual Income Tax
Liability and Effective Rates, for Selected Income Groups" in
Histoical Statistics of the United States differ from those in an
identically titled table in Statistical Abstract of the United States,
published by the same government agency."
These divergent calculations, which are only a small sample
drawn from a large literature, share a common premise, viz., that
the concept of "effective tax rates" is a useful tool of analysis.
The purpose of this essay is to examine the validity of this basic
assumption.
11. THE MEASUREMENT OF EFFECTIVE TAX RATES
A. The Effect of Progression
Throughout this discussion, we will be concerned only with
average tax rates, not with marginal rates. The distinction can be
P. SAMUEIsON, EcoNoMICS (9th ed. 1973).
" Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections
of INT. REV. CODE-of 1954).
7 P. SAMUELSON, EcoNo.tlcs 169-71 (9th ed. 1973). See also J. DuE & A. FRIEDLAEN-
DER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ECoNOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 292 (table 11-2) (5th ed.
1973) (comparing the average marginal rates under 1966 law with effective rates based
on taxable income, adjusted gross income, amended taxable .income, and amended
adjusted gross income).
"Compare BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES, COI.ONIAL TIMES TO 1957 at 702, 716-17 (table Y 319-32) (1960)
with BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1972 at 392 (table 622) (1972).
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illustrated with the aid of this extract from the schedule pre-
scribed for married persons by §1(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code:
If the taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $1,000 ............ 14% of the taxable income
Over $1,000 but not over
$2,000 .................... $140, plus 15% of excess over
Over $2,000 but not over $1,000
$3,000 .................... $290, plus 16% of excess over
$2,000
Over $200,000 ............... $110,980, plus 70% of excess
over $200,000
If a married couple has more than $1,000 of taxable income,
their average rate will always be lower than the marginal rate on
the last dollar of their taxable income. Although Zeno's tortoise
eventually got to the wall toward which he was crawling, the
average rate on taxable income never quite reaches the top
marginal rate of 70 percent. This is because the rate of tax on
the first $200,000 of-taxable income of even the richest couple is
less than 70 percent.9
This progression-induced gap between marginal and aver-
age rates is important, because journalists often confuse mar-
ginal and average rates, nourishing the illusion that a taxpayer
whose last dollar is taxed at the rate of 50 percent incurs7 an
overall tax liability of 50 percent of his entire taxable income.
"A 70% average rate could be imposed on taxpayers with more than $200,000 of
income, but it would create a so-called "notch" anomaly by taking more than 100% of the
last dollar of their income, thus leaving them less after-tax income than an otherwise
comparable couple with somewhat less pre-tax income. To illustrate, under current law, a
married couple with $200,000 of taxable income pays a tax of about $111,000 (average
rate, 55.5%), while a couple with $220,000 of taxable income is taxed at the marginal rate
of 70% on the last $20,000 of income, producing an aggregate liability of about
$125,000 (average rate, 62.5%). If the latter couple's average rate were boosted to 70%,
their after-tax income would be $66,000 ($220,000 less tax liability of $154,000)-much
less than the after-tax income ($89,000) of the couple with only $200,000 of taxable
income, as the following table indicates: Couple A Couple B
Taxable income (before tax) $200,000 $220,000
Less: tax 111,000 154,000
After-tax income $ 89,000 $ 66,000
Thus, to bring the average rate on Couple B to 70%, a tax of $43,000 would have to be
imposed on the last $20,000 of their income. The last $20,000 of Couple B's income was
taxed, in effect, at the rate of 215% ($43,000/$20,000).
To avoid this "notch" paradox, under which a taxpayer can worsen his after-tax
status by improving his pre-tax status, the progressive rate schedules have consistently
permitted the taxpayer's average rate to lag behind his marginal rate.
1974]
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But the contrast between marginal and average rates, though
central to the very concept of progression, is not the source of
the "gap" with which tax theorists are concerned. Indeed, the
rate schedules of current law, which use marginal rates, could be
converted by simple arithmetic into tables of average rates.
Average-rate schedules would be inordinately long, .because a
different rate would have to be written into law for every level of
taxable income, but they could impose the same total tax liability
at each income level as the rate schedules of current law. Thus,
the tax liability of married couples with taxable income from
$1,000 to $2,000 (described in a single line of the schedule
above) could be set forth in a rate schedule of this type:
Taxable income Rate (percent) Liability
$1,000 14.0000 $140.00
$1,010 14.0099 $141.50
...... .... .. . .....
$1,990 14.4975 $288.50
$2,000 14.5000 $290.00
As this alternative presentation demonstrates," the marginal
rates prescribed by current law are merely an abbreviated way to
impose the desired average rates.
For this reason, the fact that progression causes the
taxpayer's average rate to lag behind his marginal rate plays no
role in the phenomenon under investigation. We will be con-
cerned exclusively with the fact that taxable income-the base
used in the discussion above-is only one of numerous bases that
can be plausibly used in computing the average rate of tax on a
given taxpayer's income.
B. Nomenclature
Turning now to the competing ways of computing average
tax rates, the best starting point is a formula for deriving the
type of average rate just described:
FORMULA A
actual tax liabilityRate- = ________________
statutory tax base (taxable income)
"' The table would be even more extended if $1 intervals were used, rather than the
$10 intervals in the text. Moreover, separate tables would be required for the four
taxpaying units recognized by the Code, unmarried individuals, married couples, heads
of house old, and married persons filing separately. Additional complexities would be
added by the capital gains provisions and certain other special rules of current law.
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When applied to the married couple descrribed at the beginning
of this article, who incurred a tax liability of $4,380 on taxable
income of $20,000, Formula A yields an average rate of about 22
percent:
$4,380 (actual tax liability) _ 22%
$20,000 (taxable income)
As we saw, however, some economic benefits received by this
couple were excluded from their taxable income. If the average
rate is to reflect these items, a different formula must be used:
FORMULA B
actual tax liability
Rate =alternative base
Depending on whether the alternative base used in applying
Formula B to the couple is their gross income ($25,000) or their
"economic income" ($35,000), the rate is 19 percent
($4,380/$25,000) or 12.5 percent ($4,380/$35,000). These two
rates, however, do not exhaust the possibilities under Formula B.
The composition of the alternative base used in Formula B
depends on the preferences and judgments of the commentator,
and every change in the way the base is defined will cause a
change in the rate yielded by the formula. The alternative bases
that have been used in computations of this type include "ad-
justed gross income," "amended adjusted gross income , "ex-
panded adjusted gross income," "adjusted family income," "total
income,". "amended taxable income," and "amended gross
income."" Despite this smorgasbord of possibilities, it is common
11 For computations of effective rates of individual income taxes using such bases,
see J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 7, at 292 (table 11-2) (adjusted gross income,
amended taxable income, amended adjusted gross income); R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX 326 (table A-10) (1964) (total income); HOUSE Comm. ON WAYS & MEANS &
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., IsT SEss., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS,
U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, Pt. 1, at 81 & table 5 (Joint Comm. Print 1969) (amended taxable
income, amended adjusted gross income); H. TARASOV, WHO PAYS THE TAXES? (TNEC
Monograph No. 3, 1941) (consumer income); TAX FOUNDATION, TAX BURDENS AND
BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES BY INCOME CLASS, 1961 AND 1965, at 20 (table
7) (1967) (total income); Gillespie, Effect of Public Expenditures on the Distribution of Income,
in ESSAYS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM 122, 125-28, 135-36 (tables 3 & 4) (R. Musgrave ed.
1965) ("broad" income concept, "adjusted broad" income concept); Hearings on H.R. 8363
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 279 (1963) (amended
gross income); Herriot & Miller, The Taxes We Pay, 8 CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD, May
1971, at 31, 40 (table 7) (total income) (hereinafter cited as Taxes); Herriot & Miller,
Changes in the Distribution of Taxes among Income Groups: 1962 to 1968, in 1971
PROCEEDINGS OF THE BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS STATISTICS SECTION, AMERICAN
STATISTICAL ASSN. 106, 108 (adjusted total income) (hereinafter cited as Changes);
Pechman, Distribution of Federal and State Income Taxes by Income Classes, 27 J. FIN. 179,
182-83 (1972) (adjusted family income); Pechman & Okner, Individual Income Tax Erosion
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practice for each commentator to describe the rate resulting
from applying Formula B to his preferred alternative base as
"the" effective or actual rate. Of course, the more a
commentator's alternative base differs from the Internal Re-
venue Code's definition of taxable income, the greater the dis-
parity between the Formula -A rate, which might be called the
apparent rate, and the effective rate derived from Formula B.
Once a theorist has fixed on an alternative tax base for use
in Formula B, he may wish to go on to compute the tax that
-would be payable if the statutory rate schedule were applied to
the alternative base, and then to convert this hypothetical liability
into an average rate on the alternative base. This entails the use
of a third formula:
FORMULA C
Rate = hypothetical tax liability
alternative base
For the couple in our example, the tax liability would be $6,020
if their gross income of $25,000 were subjected to the statutory
rate schedule, resulting under Formula C in an average rate of
about 24 percent ($6,020/$25,000), while the hypothetical liabil-
ity on their economic income of $35,000 would be $9,920, or an
average rate under Formula C of about 28 percent. Rates com-
puted under Formula C are often described as nominal rates.'
2
All three of these formulas generate average rates. Although
the statutory rate schedule, with its graduated marginal rates, is
used to calculate the numerator of all three fractions (the actual
tax liability in Formulas A and B and the hypothetical tax liability
in Formula C), marginal rates play no further role in the compu-
tation. The result in each case, therefore, is an average rate.
Moreover, all three of these average rates could be described
as effective rates, since each depicts the portion of the base on
which it is computed that is consumed by taxes. An effective rate,
in other words, is simply a percentage of a particular base; the
by Income Classes, in JOINT EcoNOMIC COMMITTEE, 92D CONG., 2D SESs., THE ECONOMICS
OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS, pt. I, at 13 (Joint Comm. Print 1972) (reprinted in
Brookings Institution Reprint No. 230, 1972) (expanded adjusted gross income).
For computations of the effective rate of corporate income taxes, see 119 CONG. REC.
H7165 (daily ed., Aug. 1, 1973) (study by Congressman Vanik); HOUSE COM.MN. ON WAYS
& MEANS & SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND
PROPOSALS, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T., pt. 3, at 458-61 (Joint Comm. Print 1969) (economic
income of financial institutions).
2 Formula C rates are also occasionally referred to as statutory rates, although the
only statutory feature of such a rate is the use of statutory marginal rates to compute a
hypothetical tax liability on a hypothetical tax base. This Article will use throughout the
term "nominal rate."
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term is meaningless unless the base is specified. This means that
even marginal rates are effective rates when measured by their
own bases. The top marginal rate of 70 percent, for example,
represents an effective rate of 70 percent on all taxable income
above $200,000. But it is customary in tax analysis to reserve the
term "effective rate" for the percentages derived from Formula
B, and to use the term "nominal rate" for Formula C. Formula A
lacks a generally accepted tradename, but perhaps the label
"apparent average rate" serves to convey its meaning.
C. 4djusted Gross Income
Although almost every commentator employs a different
alternative base in computing effective rates, the usual starting
point is adjusted gross income (AGI), t3 an amount that the
theorist then expands or contracts in accordance with judgments
that will be discussed shortly. Since AGI can thus be regarded as
common ground, and moreover is sometimes used without
change in the computation of effective tax rates,' 4 it deserves to
be examined first. Disregarding refinements, AGI consists of all
receipts that are subject to tax, such as salary, dividends and
interest, and business profits, less business expenses, but undi-
minished by personal exemptions or such personal deductions as
medical expenses, alimony, interest on home mortgages, and
charitable contributions.
Since the taxpayer's AGI is always greater than his taxable
income, the effective rate of tax is lower if computed as a
percentage of AGI than if based on taxable income. The items
deducted from AGI, such as the taxpayer's personal exemptions,
are in effect taxed at a zero rate. Thus, according to the Trea-
sury Department, the tax paid by the average taxpayer with
$1,000 to $2,000 of adjusted gross income amounted to 14.5
percent of his taxable income but only 1.2 percent of his ad-
justed gross income, while the average taxpayer with $1,000,000
of adjusted gross income or more paid a tax of 67.5 percent of
taxable income but only 49 percent of adjusted gross income.' 5
13 INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 62. A less common starting point for the computation
of an alternative tax base is an overall indicator such as net national product, from which
a concept of individual income is derived. See, e.g., TAX FOUNDATION, TAX BURDENS AND
BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES BY INCOME CLASS, 1961 AND 1965 at 1-2 (1967);
Herriot & Miller, Taxes, supra note 11, at 31; Herriot & Miller, Changes, supra note 11, at
106, 110; Pechman, supra note 11, at 182.
14 See Paul, Erosion of the Tax Base and Rate Structure, in SuVcOm.Ni. ON TAX POl.ICY OF
THE JOINT COMM. ON THE EcONONC REPORT, 84TH CONG., IST SESS., FEDERAL TAX
POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 297, 299-300 (Comm. Print 1955).
15 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, STATISTICS OF
INCoME-19 7 1, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS (PREI.IMINARY) 6 (table 1) (1973).
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Because a taxpayer's AGI is ordinarily the amount available
to him for personal expenditures, it is usually regarded as a
better base for effective tax rate computations than taxable
income. For a taxpayer at the bottom of the income ladder,
however, a computation based on taxable income-the balance
after personal exemptions and the low income allowance have
been deducted-may be more illuminating. Consider an urban
family of four with AGI of $5,000, whose 1972 tax liability is
$100. Expressed as a fraction of AGI, this liability is only 2
percent, but it is 14 percent of the family's taxable income of
$700. Since the family's income is only about $800 above the
urban poverty line, and a sizeable part of this margin must be
paid to the Treasury, the statement that their effective tax rate is
14 percent ($100 tax on $700 of taxable income) may convey a
more accurate picture of their financial sacrifice than the state-
ment that they are taxed at only 2 percent ($100 tax on $5,000 of
AGI). The expert can readily place either rate in proper context;
but if a journalist or political orator describes one as "the"
effective rate, he will imply that the'tax either imposes a hard-
ship on the family ("14 percent of income") or is trivial ("2
percent of income"), depending on which of the two arithmet-
ically correct rates he chooses.
For another example, consider a couple with $50,000 of
adjusted gross income, but only $10,000 of taxable income
because of deductible casualty losses and medical expenses
caused by a fire that destroyed their home and injured their
children. Assuming a tax liability of $2,000, they can be de-
scribed as paying 4 percent of their AGI ($50,000) or 20 percent
of taxable income ($10,000). Either way, the arithmetic is im-
peccable. In choosing between these rates, the analyst implicitly
expresses an opinion on the propriety of allowing taxpayers to
deduct medical expenses and casualty losses. If the commentator
disapproves of or barely tolerates these deductions, he is likely to
assert that the "true" effective rate is only 4 percent.
16
These percentages are averages for each income class; the effective rate on any individual
taxpayer may be higher or lower than the average. The dispersion is especially pro-
nounced for effective rates based on AGI, since each AGI class embraces taxpayers with a
wide range of taxable incomes.
" I have argued elsewhere, however, that these deductions are, in general, consistent
with the Haig-Simons definition of income. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits and
Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 16 J. LAW & EcoN. 193 (1973). If accepted, this line of
argument suggests that effective tax rates are more illuminating if computed on a base
that takes these deductions into account, and that in the example just described, the
couple's burden is better described as 20%, rather than 4%, of their available income. See
also Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 331-43
(1972).
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The choice between taxable income and AGI as a measure
of the taxpayer's effective rate is further complicated by several
technical aspects of AGI, which account for some of the striking
examples recently offered of millionaires who pay no tax. Al-
though AGI ordinarily reflects the taxpayer's disposable income
after allowing for his business expenses and losses, it does not
always do so. One of the much-publicized 106 taxpayers with
AGI of $200,000 or more who paid no taxes in 1970, for
example, reported $400,000 of gambling winnings and an offset-
ting loss of $400,000 from the same activity, with the result that
his federal income tax liability was zero. 17 Because the $400,000
of profit was included in his AGI while the loss was deducted
"below the line" (i.e., deducted from AGI in computing taxable
income), he appeared as a taxpayer with $400,000 of AGI and
no tax liability. He attained this distinction, however, only be-
cause he was unusually scrupulous in complying with the Inter-
nal Revenue Code's technical definition of AGI.18 Many tax-
payers in similar circumstances would simply have offset the loss
against the income and reported that their AGI was zero.
This statutory separation of income from its offsetting de-
ductions is not unique to gambling, but extends to a number of
other activities and transactions as well. According to the Trea-
sury, 75 of the 106 nontaxable returns with AGI over $200,000
claimed very large deductions for interest and other investment
expenses incurred in profit-oriented transactions. These were
deducted "below the line," while the gross income derived from
the same transactions entered into the taxpayer's AGI.' 9 When
large amounts are involved, the unexplained use of AGI as a
base in computing effective tax rates is misleading. To invoke a
private law analogy, if a businessman with AGI of $1,000,000
and investment expenses of $900,000 reported to his creditors
that his income was $1,000,000 rather than $100,000, they would
no doubt charge him with fraud. This may be too severe a label
for the statistical arguments of politicians, but the audience to
which an AGI analysis is addressed should at least be put on
notice that a taxpayer's AGI may greatly exceed the amount
available to defray his personal expenditures.
Adjusted gross income, then, sometimes overstates the
taxpayer's gain by failing to take account of expenses incurred in
17Hearings on Tax Subsidies and Tax Reform Before the Joint Economic Comm., 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 158 (1972) (remarks by Under Secretary of the Treasury E.S. Cohen).
18 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 62.
Hearings on Tax Subsidies and Tax Reform Before the Joint Economic Comm., 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 157-58 (1972).
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earning income. But this is neither its only, nor ordinarily its
most important, deficiency as a base for computing effective tax
rates. It can err in the opposite direction, understating the
taxpayer's gain by omitting items that improve his economic
position. This is because AGI is a creature of the Internal
Revehue Code, computed after the exclusion or deduction of
such perennial candidates for tax reform as exempt interest on
state and municipal bonds2 1 the untaxed half of long-term
capital gains,21 and percentage depletion,22 as well as numerous
less controversial receipts, such as sick pay,23 employer contribu-
tions to qualified pension and profit-sharing plans,24 and meals
and lodging furnished to the taxpayer for the convenience of his
employer.25 To take items like these into account in computing
effective tax rates, it is necessary to construct a new base, corre-
sponding to the taxpayer's "economic" or "true" income.
D. Economic Income
For many years it was difficult for tax analysts to break loose
from AGI as a base in computing effective tax rates, despite its
deficiencies, because the Treasury Department's official statistical
summary of individual income tax returns classifies taxpayers by
AGI levels. The advent of the computer and the preparation of a
master statistical tape with the details from a representative
sample of 90,000 personal income tax returns ended this bond-
age to !he Internal Revenue Code's definitions, by enabling tax
statisti-ians to create an alternative hypothetical tax base, or a
variety 'of such bases, broken down by income classes. 26 As a
result, tax liabilities imposed by current law can be expressed, for
each income class, as a percentage of whatever new base is
selected for comparison and analysis. It is also feasible to apply
the statutory rates to the new base, and thus derive the nominal
rate described by Formula C above.
27
The new base may be created by taking the information now
appearing on tax returns and putting it together in a different
form, for example by adding the untaxed one-half of long-term
"' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 103.
21 Id. § 1202.22 1d. § 613.23 Id. § 104.
24 Id. § 404.
251d. § 119.
26 See Okner, Constructing a New Data Base from Existing Microdata Sets: the 1966 Merge
File, 1 ANNALS OF EcON. & Soc. MEASUREMENT 325, 326 n.2 (1972), summarized in
Pechman & Okner, supra note 11, pt. 1, at 13-16. See also COMM'N TO REVISE THE TAX
STRUCTURE, REFORMING THE FEDERAL TAX STRUCTURE 147-55 (App. A) (1973).
27 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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capital gains to adjusted gross income. To achieve a broader
concept of "economic income," the analyst may revise the data
on the returns by replacing statutory methods of computing
income with methods that he deems more accurate, such as
substituting straight-line depreciation for accelerated deprecia-
tion and cost for percentage depletion. He may go further afield,
by imputing receipts that the return itself does not report or
even hint at, like tax-exempt interest and unrealized apprecia-
tion, and by adjusting for assumed errors by the taxpayer,
employing a combination of statistical extrapolation, educated
inferences and guesswork.
In an imaginative and painstaking effort of this type, Pech-
man and Okner, of the Brookings Institution, converted AGI
into a more comprehensive tax base, which, although influenced
by the Haig-Simons definition of income, also embodied the
authors' judgments on debatable issues of fairness, administra-
tive practicality and political reality.2s When the tax liabilities
imposed by existing law are expressed as percentages of this
broad base, denominated "expanded adjusted gross income," the
effective tax rates range from 0.5 percent on income under
$3,000, to 32.1 percent on income of one million dollars and
above. 29 The top rate of 32.1 percent on this base compares with
a top effective rate of 49 or 67.5 percent when taxable income or
AGI, respectively, is used as the base. 30 When the statutory rates
are applied to the Pechman-Okner tax base, using Formula C
above, revenue rises from $103 billion to $180 billion-an in-
crease of $77 billion.3 1
The Pechman-Okner effective rates would be lower if their
comprehensive tax base had included unrealized appreciation,
gifts and bequests, employer contributions to private pension
plans, and some other items that they regard as embraced by an
economic concept of income but that they excluded from their
comprehensive base for reasons of administrative convenience or
historical precedent. On the other hand, the Pechman-Okner
rates would have been higher if they had preserved some of the
present law's other exclusions, such as public assistance, unem-
ployment insurance, workmen's compensation, and social se-
curity; and the extra exemptions for aged and blind taxpayers.3 2
2SPechman & Okner, supra note 11, pt. 1, at 16-21.
291d. 22 (table 2).
30 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, STATISTICS OF
INCOME-1971, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS (PRELIMINARY) (1973).
31 Pechman & Okner, supra note 11, pt. 1, at 22-23 (tables 2 & 3).
32 1d. 16-21.
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The leverage exerted by the assumptions that underlie the tax
base that is used to compute effective tax rates can be illustrated
by a later study from the Pechman-Okner computer, which uses
"adjusted family income" as the base. 33 Because this concept is
substantially broader than the base used in the earlier
Pechman-Okner study, since retained corporate profits are im-
puted to the taxpayer and all personal deductions ahd exemp-
tions are denied, the effective rates computed on this base are
substantially lower for all taxpayers above the $10,000 income
level. A third recent study, similar in methodology but contrast-
ing in its assumptions, can be usefully compared with the two
Pechman-Okner studies.3 4 Its tax base includes unrealized ap-
preciation and depreciation, employee fringe benefits, corporate
income (whether distributed or undistributed), scholarships and
fellowships, mortality gains on life insurance, and some other
currently untaxed items, generating a set of effective tax rates
that differ markedly from both Pechman-Okner computations.
But these three studies by no means exhaust the possible
variations on the effective tax rate theme. -By taking into account
the value of services performed in the home, allowing a deduc-
tion for net savings, 'adjusting for inflation, or adopting still
other tax reform proposals, one can create a host of other tax
bases, each of which would yield a different set of effective tax
rates. Indeed, each can be made to yield several sets of effective
rates, by varying the taxpaying unit-by aggregating the income
of minor children and their parents, for example, or by dividing
the joint income of married couples between husband and wife.
Thus, whenever an effective rate of tax is computed not as a
mathematical curiosity, but as the foundation of a normative
conclusion about the tax system, the base-whether it is taxable
income, adjusted gross income, or some variety of "economic
income"-embodies a myriad of value judgments. These
threshold judgments, often implicit rather than explicit, amount
in the aggregate to an assertion that the components included in
the base are relevant to taxpaying capacity, and that those
excluded are not. It follows that the process of defining the base
used in computing effective tax rates is comparable to the
.process of criticizing the Internal Revenue Code, and that there
are as many effective rates as there are "ideal" Internal Revenue
Codes. At the core, these alternative measures of the taxpayer's
33 Pechman, supra note 11.
34 COMM'N TO REVISE THE TAX STRUCTURE, REFORMING THE FEDERAL TAX STRUCTURE
(Fund for Public Policy Research) (Galvin, Willis, et al.) (1973).
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effective rate overlap, since all of them include such fundamen-
tal items as salaries and business profits while excluding such
equally fundamental items as business expenses and the cost of
goods sold. There are, however, enough differences in the
treatment of many other items to provide a cornucopia of
effective rates. With this array of computations to choose from, a
journalist or political orator can safely describe the income tax
structure as severely--or barely-progressive. He will rarely be
called upon to explain, and will often not know, that the alterna-
tives reflect divergent judgments about the items that should be
taxed or taken into account in measuring taxpaying capacity.
III. ARE THE STATUTORY RATES SACROSANCT?
So far, we have been concerned primarily with comparisons
between the effective rate on taxable income and the effective
rate on the commentator's alternative nonstatutory base, in
which both calculations employ the actual tax liability under
existing law (Formulas A and B above). But recent discussions
often entail a second comparison-between the effective rate of
actual tax on the proposed alternative base (Formula B) and the
rate of the hypothetical tax liability that would result from
applying the statutory rate schedule to the alternative base (For-
mula C). This comparison unveils a disparity between the "effec-
tive" and "nominal" rates whose width depends on how far the
commentator travels from existing law; the greater his dissatis-
faction with the Internal Revenue Code's concept of taxable
income, the wider the gap.
After calling attention to the gap, critics of existing law
sometimes assert, explicitly or implicitly, that the American pub-
lic has been misinformed or even betrayed. In the words of one
recent study of the tax system: "The only possible purpose of
such a gap [between nominal and effective rates] is to trick the
American public into thinking that its preferences for a progres-
sive income tax are being implemented when they are not. '3' At
its most optimistic, the betrayal theory implies that the public's
commitment to the progressive rate structure is so powerful that,
once the obstacles to its achievement are exposed, they will be
swept away. A similarly critical, but less heated, reaction to the
"gap" is annoyance that society is unwilling to admit what it is
doing. "Impose whatever rates you want," the observer seems to
be saying, "but don't preach progression unless you are willing to
35 L. THUROW, THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 154 (1971).
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practice it.' '3 6 Sometimes the tone is less evangelical than be-
mused, as though a detached observer were calling attention to a
pathetic social effort to worship both progression and financial
success.
The betrayal theory has much in common with the notion
that the Internal Revenue Code is a vast "welfare program for
the rich," riddled with loopholes that are known to crafty lawyers
and their clients but hidden from public view. 7 Both views are
equally out of touch with the facts of life. To begin with, there is
no single rate schedule. The schedules for single persons, mar-
ried couples and heads of households are all parts of a legislative
whole, and so are the special rate applicable to long-term capital
gains, the zero rate applicable to state and municipal bond
interest, and the Code's numerous deductions and exclusions.
All have been enacted by Congress, and if one part of this
complex rate structure is better known and more widely en-
dorsed by the public than another, it is by no means clear that it
is the 14 to 70 percent marginal rate schedule.
To escape the inconvenient fact that the entire Code, not
just a few sections, was enacted by Congress, it may be argued
that the rate structure-the 14 to 70 percent ladder and the
average rate resulting from these marginal rates-embodies the
General Will, but that all provisions narrowing the tax base
reflect craven surrenders to special privilege. But this is not a
promising way to analyze as complex a product of the political
process as the Internal Revenue Code, whose major departures
from a comprehensive tax base ("preferences") are tenaciously
defended by an extraordinarily wide spectrum--"coalition"
would not be a misnomer-of taxpayers. Among other defects,
this approach treats such major components of the tax structure
as income-splitting, capital gains, personal deductions and ex-
emptions, accelerated depreciation, and the realization concept
as though they were protuberances stealthily grafted onto the
Code in a legislative twilight.
There are, of course, innumerable statutory excrescences
that confer benefits exclusively on special interests in the nar-
rowest sense. 38 But these provisions, however objectionable, ac-
count for only a small part of the tax gap at issue. Its real causes
16 See Musgrave, How Progressive is the Income Tax?, in 3 HousE Comm. ON WAYS &
MEANS, TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 2223, 2230 (1959).
37See Stem, Uncle Sam's Welfare Program-For the Rich, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1972,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 28, col. 1.3 8 See Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing
Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1955).
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are provisions like those listed above, and they are as prominent
and persistent a part of the tax system as the rate schedule itself.
Indeed, during the two decades since enactment of the 1954
Code, these structural provisions have been repeatedly expanded
by Congress while the rate differential has been explicitly nar-
rowed, from a maximum average rate of 87 percent in 1954. to
less than 70 percent today or, in the case of earned income, 50
percent.39 Judged by history, if one can speak of a national
commitment to a progressive rate schedule, there is an equally
powerful commitment to a less-than-comprehensive tax base.
In thus rejecting the "betrayal" theory, I do not mean to
imply that all tax provisions are equally worthy of preservation,
or that more public exposure would not be salutary. My point,
rather, is that the statutory rate schedule cannot be insulated
against reexamination when other major aspects of the Code are
being criticized. Since there are no objective standards for judg-
ing the fairness of the rate structure, the social scientist may wish
to treat it as a revealed social preference, and then argue that
provisions narrowing the tax base (e.g., personal deductions,
percentage depletion, accelerated depreciation, and the capital
gains deduction) undermine this sacrosanct social judgment. It is
obviously tempting for the analyst to say: "I am announcing no
personal preference, but am instead performing the neutral
analytical function of demonstrating that Congress has failed to
deliver what it promised." The trouble with this forensic posture,
of course, is that the Internal Revenue Code's statutory rates and
its less-than-comprehensive base are interrelated parts of a single
whole. Thus, if one is a revealed social preference, so is the
other. Both come from Capitol Hill, which, though less lofty
than Mount Sinai, is the only nonsectarian source of revelation in
our society. This does not mean that whatever is, is right, nor
does it embody the error of thinking that "the political system
works perfectly, and society never makes mistakes. '4 ° It does
mean that there is no neutral proof that the political system
worked correctly in fixing tax rates but erred in defining the tax
base. In short, the statutory rates cannot properly be "held
constant" while the statutory base is simultaneously denounced
as a betrayal of the public's wishes.
Indeed, it is wholly unlikely that proponents of the betrayal
theory would want an across-the-board elimination of the gap
39 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348; J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 225 (table A-1)
(rev. ed. 1971).40 L. THUROW, supra note 35, at 163.
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between effective and nominal rates (i.e., between Formulas B
and C), despite their protestations. In 1969, for example, the
effective tax rate for taxpayers with $1,500 to $2,000 of "total
income" (as defined) was only .about one fiftieth of the nominal
rate, while it was about one-half of the nominal rate for tax-
payers with income of $1 million or more.4I To turn from
averages to individuals, I call attention to the hypothetical family
of four with AGI of $5,000, described earlier,42 whose tax would
rise from $100 under existing law to $810 if the statutory rate
were applied to their "total income" by use of Formula C. Most
critics of the "gap" would surely prefer the effective rates now
applicable to such low income taxpayers over the nominal rates,
despite their professed allegiance to the revealed social prefer-
ences embodied in the latter.
43
A similarly ironic reversal of emphasis is illustrated by
Senator McGovern's ill-fated original tax proposal of 1972,
which coupled a flat nominal rate of 32.5 percent on a broad
base with a tax credit ("demogrant") of $1,000 per capita. The
arithmetic of the proposal was a gross tentative tax of $340
billion, reduced by the credits to a net yield of $126 billion."
The resulting gap of $224 billion between the nominal yield of
the proposed tax and its effective yield was 3 times the $77
billion gap under existing law.45 The Senator, therefore, quite
rightly wished to persuade the public that the effective rates
were what counted, and that the nominal rate was only a techni-
cal device. His opponents, understandably, repeatedly pointed to
the nominal rates as proof of McGovern's true objective-his
"revealed social preference," as it were.
A study mentioned earlier complains that "[i]nstead of mak-
ing social value judgments clear and explicit [in the area of
taxation], deliberate efforts are made to hide special
privileges. ' 46 But how, for example, can a political decision to tax
capital gains at a lower rate than other income be made more
"clear and explicit" than by a law taxing capital gains at a lower
41
J. PECHMAN, supra note 39, at 298-99 (table C-1l).
42 See text following note 15 supra.
43 In the case of low income taxpayers, the gap is largely attributable to the statutory
personal exemptions, which are sometimes described as part of the rate schedule. See,
e.g., Musgrave, supra note 36. Though this theory implies pro tanto there is no gap to be
closed, the numerous versions of "economic income," see sources cited note 11 supra, are
almost always computed before exemptions, thus broadening the gap between nominal
and effective rates to which Thurow and others object. See L. THUROW, supra note 35.
44See Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71 MICH. L.R. 1099,
1123-26 (1973); G. HART, RIGHT FROM THE START 190-94 (1973).
45 Pechman & Okner, supra note 11.
46 L. THUROW, supra note 35, at 154.
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES: FACT OR FANCY?
rate than other income? The commentator's own remedy is as
follows: "To insure that the public knows what is occurring it is
. . . necessary to implement a requirement that tax laws be
written in such a fashion that nominal and effective rates can not
differ by other than trivial amounts. 47 The recommendation is
appealing until one thinks about how it could be enforced.
Unless Congress provides that criticism of the Internal Revenue
Code is treason, anyone can advocate enactment of a tax base
that differs substantially from the statutory base (e.g., including
unrealized appreciation and imputed income in the base or, if
they are included by law, excluding them), and that is all one
needs to prove by using Formulas B and C that there is a more
than "trivial" gap between the nominal and effective rates. Aside
from forbidding advocacy of a change in law, the only way to
insure that nominal and effective rates do not differ is to enact a
tax base commanding such unanimous allegiance that another
could not be envisioned. Faith in this alternative calls to mind the
Duke of Wellington's response when a hapless governmental
clerk accosted him with the greeting, "Mr. Jones, I believe?" The
Duke's reply: "If you believe that, you'll believe anything."
IV. THE IMPACT OF OTHER TAXES
So far, we have been concerned with effective income tax
rates, which take account of the personal income tax and, less
frequently, the corporate income tax to the extent that its bur-
den falls on the corporation's individual shareholders. Because
the effect of income taxes, whether progressive, proportional or
regressive, can be reinforced or counterbalanced by state, local
and other federal taxes, tax scholars have sought to measure the
aggregate effective rate of all taxes, using the taxpayer's income
as the base.48 Since the taxes that are to be brought into the
consolidated formula are not based on the taxpayer's income but
on a wide variety of other events and transactions, they must
somehow be allocated among taxpayers by reference to income,
rather than according to the taxpayer's participation in the
47Id. 155.
48 A pioneering effort is H. TARASOV, supra note 11. Later studies include: TAX
FOUNDATION, TAX BURDENS AND BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES BY INCOME
CLAss, 1961 and 1965 (1967); Gillespie, Effect of Public Expenditures on the Distribution of
Income, in ESSAYS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM 135-36 (tables 3 & 4) (R. Musgrave ed. 1965);
Herriot & Miller, Changes, supra note 11; Herriot & Miller, Taxes, supra note 11; R.
MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 366-72 (1973).
For discussion of the interesting fact that these consolidated measures use income
rather than some other economic characteristic as the computational base, see notes 55-58
infra & accompanying text.
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activity generating the particular tax liability. Thus, the retail
sales tax is paid by taxpayers when they purchase goods and
services for consumption, with the result that the aggregate
amount paid is proportional to .each taxpayer's expenditures for
taxable items. If this amount is to be consolidated with other
taxes paid by a taxpayer to determine the percentage of his
income that is absorbed by taxes, however, it must be expressed
as a fraction of his income rather than as a fraction of his
purchases. A similar conversion is required in order to bring real
property taxes, gift and inheritance taxes, excise taxes and other
levies into the consolidated formula.
The allocation to taxpayers at each income level of taxes that
are deductible in computing federal taxable income can be based
either on the deductions actually taken by them or, in the case of
taxpayers who elect the standard deduction in lieu of itemizing
their personal deductions, on inferences from the amounts de-
ducted by itemizers. More debatable inferences are required to
allocate by income classes such nondeductible taxes as federal
excises and federal and state death taxes, and the process be-
comes even more attenuated if taxes- are to be allocated to
persons who do not pay the tax but who bear its economic
burden. Corporate income taxes, for example, eventually fall on
natural persons, but economists are not agreed on whether the
burden is borne by the shareholders of the corporations paying
the tax, or is shifted to consumers, employees and suppliers, or
investors generally. The effective rate of federal and state corpo-
-ration income taxes is very sensitive to the choice among these
assumptions. According to one study, for example, the effective
rate for taxpayers with adjusted family income of one million
dollars and over is 40 percent if the tax is allocated to sharehol-
ders, but only 19 percent if it is allocated among all investors;
and the rate would be still lower if the tax was treated as shifted
to consumers.
49
Although these computations of effective consolidated tax
rates invariably assume that some taxes are passed on by the
nominal taxpayers to purchasers of their goods and services and
'9 Pechman, supra note 11, at 187 (table 4). See generally R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUS
GRAVE, supra note 48, at 354-72; Mieszkowski, On the Theory of Tax Incidence, 75 J. PoL.
ECON. 250 (1967); and my legal fantasy based on the shifting of taxes, Bittker, The Case of
the Fictitious Taxpayer: The Federal Taxpayer's Suit Twenty Years After Flast v. Cohen, 36 U.
Cm. L. REV. 364 (1969).
For a powerful argument that "the very concept of the incidence of a corporation
income tax or other broad-based tax as such is invalid" and that econometric studies
attempting to measure the incidence of such taxes "necessarily reveal nothing about this
nonexistent phenomenon," see C. Suoup, PUBLIC FINANCE 11-19 (1969); see also Prest,
Statistical Calculations of Tax Burdens, 22 ECONOMICA 234 (1955).
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that the latter should be viewed as the real taxpayers, the
contrary assumption-that the economic burden of the tax re-
mains on the taxpayer who is required by law to pay it-is
universally employed in determining who pays the personal
income tax. This assumption is based on the theory that a
taxpayer cannot charge more for his goods and services than
those of his competitors who pay no income tax because they are
operating at the break-even point, and who therefore fix their
prices without regard to income taxes.50 The theory that income
taxes are not business expenses that can, or must, be passed on
to purchasers of the taxpayer's goods and services is buttressed
by the theory that the prices that will maximize a taxpayer's
profits before income tax will also maximize his post-tax
profits. 5 ' Thus, the enactment of an income tax, or an increase
in the rates of an existing tax, provides neither an incentive nor
an opportunity to increase prices; if there had been any slack in
the market, the taxpayer would have already increased his prices
to absorb it.
This is not the place for a critical examination of the
assumption, in discussions of vertical equity, that the income tax
rests where it is imposed. But I wish to call attention to two
puzzling aspects of the assumption, while leaving detailed ex-
amination of the issues to the econohmists. Some students of
the corporate income tax assert, and a larger number accept the
possibility, that the tax is shifted to some extent to the
corporation's customers. 52 But if the classical axiom that income
taxes cannot be shifted is to give way in this instance, it is difficult
to exclude the possibility that the personal income tax is shifted
to the same extent by unincorporated enterprises, such as sole
proprietorships and partnerships, that compete with corporate
businesses. And if this possibility is entertained, is it not also
possible that there is some shifting by persons who are in the
business of providing personal services, such as self-employed
professionals and even wage-earners and salaried employees?
The computation of effective tax fates is complicated still
further by the fact that income taxes alter the relationship
50 This theory, of course, assumes that a tax on income can be distinguished from
other types of taxes, such as taxes on the privilege of conducting the business, on the use
of property, on the payment of wages, etc. I know, however, of no effort to specify the
characteristics of an income tax that are presupposed by the traditional no-shifting
theory. Does it presuppose, for example, that net worth changes are taken into account
currently, or that all taxpayers must use the same method of computing depreciation?
51 For a discussion of the arguments for and against this proposition see PECHMAN,
supra note 39, at 112-13.
'2 See discussions and studies listed by authors cited notes 48-49 supra.
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between work and leisure for taxpayers engaged in the perfor-
mance of services. The taxpayer derives a lower net yield from
his work, while the pleasures of leisure are unchanged. By itself,
this decrease in the relative value of work would impel him to
substitute leisure for labor. This "substitution" or "price" effect
of the tax, however, runs counter to its "income" effect, since to
regain his preexisting level of disposable income, he Will have to
work harder. The income effect of the tax may be more power-
ful than its substitution effect for taxpayers at some income
levels, and less powerful at others; and it would be astonishing if
the point where they come into equilibrium was not affected by
the taxpayer's age, sex, marital status, education, religion and
philosophical outlook. If these variables are not distributed on a
random basis among taxpayers, but are linked with occupational
choices, the work-leisure impact of income taxation may alter the
prices of goods and services offered on the market, and thus.
affect pre-tax incomes.
The fact that income and taxes are interdependent variables
was once described in a discouragingly cosmic metaphor:
The stone thrown into the ocean makes ripples which,
as they diminish in height with the widening of the
circles, may extend-could we but measure their
infinitesimal magnitude-to shores thousands of miles
away. And the light rays which their movement deflects
from the courses these rays would otherwise follow, may
pursue their new way through the stellar universe far
past the remotest stars of which the telescope informs
us. Similarly, the effects, could we consider all of them
in their (possibly) increasing variety though (probably)
diminishing intensity, of any given tax, may extend
through the future to and beyond the time when
human beings shall have ceased to tenant the earth.
53
This was written before the age of Sputnik, and it might be
thought that the same computer which now plots interstellar
travel could follow the ripples of an income tax to the farthest
reaches of the universe. But technological advances in the pro-
cessing of numbers have not been accompanied by comparably
improved ways to measure human impulses. As a result, the
calculations disgorged by the computer are no better than the
imprecise guesses that it feeds on, though the precision of
the output can easily blind the layman to the deficiencies of the
input.
53 H. BROWN, THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 12-13 (1924).
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V. WHAT ARE EFFECTIVE TAX RATES GOOD FOR?
What are calculations of effective tax rates good for? If the
limitations just described are discounted as needlessly finicky,
overcome by improved techniques, or simply disregarded, do the
computations tell us anything useful about the world we live in?
For example, if an astronaut with $25,000 of economic income is
subject to an effective consolidated tax rate of 20 percent,
leaving him with $20,000 of after-tax income, can we properly
infer that a revision of the tax laws to exempt him from all taxes
would increase his take-home pay from $20,000 to $25,000? The
obvious answer is that this inference would be reasonable if the
legislation is confined to John J. Arcturus, of 4201 Mars Blvd.,
Cape Canaveral, Florida.
But the assumption that his disposable income would in-
crease by the amount of his former tax burden would be absurd
if extended simultaneously to all taxpayers. Without taxes, there
would be no government, or at least no government except by
unanimous consent. To assume that today's pattern of pre-tax
income would continue in this awesome state of affairs is as
fatuous as telling someone who sleeps a third of every day that
kicking the habit would give him eight extra hours a day for
work.
Recognizing that without taxes, there would be no public
expenditures, an occasional economist volunteers for the heroic
task of describing the pattern of income that would prevail in "a
world without taxes and [governmental] expenditures." In such a
utopia, we are told by a recent study, adult men would work less
while women and teenagers would work more, producing in the
aggregate "a 2.5 percent increase in the average hours of
leisur e. ' 4 However comforting this conclusion may be to my
generation of male parents, it is probably not the last word on
the subject, and the methodology on which it rests is still in its
infancy. But the author's premise of a complex interrelationship
between taxes, governmental expenditures and income is ir-
refutable.
This critical interrelationship is easily misunderstood or
overlooked by the layman when he is confronted by a table of
pre-tax incomes, effective tax rates and post-tax incomes. It is all
too easy to conclude from such a tabular presentation that taxes
reduce everybody's income in the way they seem to reduce the
reader's individual income. From this oversimplified conclusion,
54 L. THUROW, supra note 35, at 75-76. But see Prest, supra note 49.
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it is only a short step to still another: that changes in taxes affect
only the taxpayer's post-tax income. In fact, however, pre-tax
income is what it is partly because taxes are what they are. To
illustrate the point with hypothetical round numbers, for all
individual taxpayers as a class, $800 billion of pre-tax personal
income less $200 billion of taxes equals $600 billion of post-tax
income, but it is equally true that $600 billion of post-tax income
plus $200 billion of taxes equals $800 billion of pre-tax income.
Neither formulation tells us whether the chicken or the egg came
first.
As a guide to political action, therefore, calculations of
effective tax rates-even if they did not depend on so many
debatable assumptions-must be used with caution. At the mar-
gin, they suggest that raising the rates here and lowering them
there or repealing this tax and substituting that one would
nudge us toward or away from equality, and they provide a clue
to the size of this change in after-tax income. To predict the
impact of more exhilarating changes, however, they are gravely
deficient unless revised to reflect the consequential changes in
the distribution of pre-tax income. When these changes have
been absorbed, the after-tax distribution of income may be quite
different from what was predicted, because the tax innovation
may alter pre-tax income more than it alters after-tax income.
The outcome, in short, may be closer to, or farther from, the
status quo ante than was predicted or desired.
VI. "INCOME" AS THE BASE FOR A CONSOLIDATED TAX
Earlier in this article, I described attempts to compute the
consolidated burden or effective rate of all types of taxes by
income classes. 55 The fact that some species of income is used as
the computational base in these projects is worthy of attention.
Why is the consolidated burden portrayed as a percentage of the
taxpayer's income, rather than calculated by reference to such
other characteristics as the taxpayer's consumer expenditures,
wealth, net worth change, occupation, age or real property? Why
does the analyst allocate taxes on cigarettes by reference to the
taxpayer's income, for example, but refrain from allocating
income taxes by reference to the taxpayer's purchases of ciga-
rettes?
Occasionally, to be sure, we encounter calculations that
allocate the tax burden on a per capita basis, such as statements
" See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra.
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that "every man, woman, and child in the United States pays an
average tax of $3 per day" or that "the per capita tax burden in
the United States is twice, or one-half, the per capita burden in
Sweden or Paraguay." Similarly, we are sometimes told that taxes
constitute X percent of every dollar paid for whiskey; and when
a big truck passes me on an interstate highway, I sometimes
discern through the haze of its exhaust an announcement that
"This truck pays $17,456 per year in taxes." But the purpose of
calculations like these is rhetorical rather than normative: to
shock the reader, not to assert that taxes should be levied on a
per capita, per bottle or per truck basis.
When personal tax burdens are computed as a percentage
of the taxpayer's income, however, the computation almost al-
ways embodies a normative assumption, viz., that the fairness of
the aggregate tax burden depends on its relation to the
taxpayer's income. This premise clearly underlies efforts to
compute the effective rate of the income tax itself, leading to
claims that the tax is too progressive or not progressive enough,
or that it is more or less progressive than the layman is led to
believe. More important, the same premise underlies calculations
of the burden of taxes that are not explicitly related to the
taxpayer's income. When we are told, for example, that a state
retail sales tax imposes a heavier burden on low income than on
high income taxpayers, the assertion is not intended as evidence
that the poor buy more taxable goods than the rich. The point,
rather, is that their sales tax burden, computed as a percentage
of income, is greater than the sales tax burden on rich taxpayers.
The assumption, of course, is that the fairness of the burden
should be judged by translating the absolute amount paid into a
percentage of income; and the comparison implicitly rejects the
idea that fairness is insured by the fact that the tax is a fixed
percentage of each dollar spent for taxable goods, or by the fact
that the average poor person buys fewer taxable goods than the
average rich person.
Similarly, when local real property taxes are expressed as
percentages of income, the implicit assumption is that the rela-
tionship is not a curious statistic, but the basis for a normative
judgment. During the 1972 presidential campaign, for example,
President Nixon favored federal aid to the states to finance a 50
percent reduction in local property taxes, asserting that the
highest priority should be given to elderly retired persons with
incomes of less than $2,000 a year, "who on the average pay a
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:780
property tax of 33V3 percent of that income." The President
went on to say: "Now that is fiscally wrong, morally wrong, and
certainly tax wrong. ' 56 A similar assumption underlies Professor
Heller's endorsement of the per capita credit (so-called "circuit
breakers") granted by some state retail sales taxes: "These
refinements are aimed at converting the sales tax into a progres-
sive tax. Through this interlocking of sales and income taxes, we
may yet make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. ' 57 A similar desire
to "make a silk purse out of a sow's ear" can be discerned in
suggestions that a federal value-added tax could be devised with
exemptions for low income taxpayers so that its burden would
not be regressive when measured by the taxpayer's income.
The use of income as a normative base, whatever the formal
base may be for a particular tax, is not confined to theoreticians
and political spokesmen, but has received formal congressional
endorsement. The allocation of revenue-sharing grants under
the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 depends in part
on the state's "tax effort," measured by a formula that relates its
aggregate tax collections to the aggregate personal income of its
population. 58 The formula springs from a legislative premise
that a state's effort to help itself should be judged by reference to
the personal income of its residents rather than by reference to
such other characteristics as their expenditures, net worth, real
property or current savings.
This pervasive acceptance of income as the normative base
for taxation suggests that the logical next step would be to
replace- all federal, state and local taxes by a single federal
income tax, coupled with grants by the federal government to
states and cities. If the fairness of each individual tax is to be
judged by its relationship to the taxpayer's income and its capac-
ity to make up for the deficiencies of those of its teammates
falling short of the ideal, why not go for the real thing at the
outset by enacting a Single Tax on Income to achieve directly
what individual taxes imposed on a variety of bases can only
grope for?
There are, of course, constitutional provisions, political
56 New York Times, Oct. 6, 1972, at 28, col. 3.
57 W. HELLER, NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 131-32 (1966). But see
Hearings on S. 1255 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 40-46 (1973) (Statement of H. Aaron).
58 31 U.S.C. § 1225 (1970). See S. REP. No. 1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, 30-34
(1972). The House bill went further down this road by explicitly favoring states with an
income tax, but this provision was dropped in conference. See S. REP. No. 1229, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. .(1972); Calaba, The Analysis and Application of the State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972, 28 TAx L. REv. 377 (1973).
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forces, and institutional factors that preclude such a national
Single Tax on Income as a viable legislative proposal. Even as an
ideal, however, it has its limitations. Some tax provisions are not
intended to distribute the burdens of government according to a
social judgment on the taxpayer's ability to pay, but to discour-
age or encourage particular activities, such as the smoking of
cigarettes, the emission of pollutants, the discovery of oil, or the
construction of low-cost housing. The distributional effects of
such a provision are important, and if found to be objectionable
might in some circumstances lead to a revision or abandonment
of the original objective. But if the provision's distributional
impact is an acceptable price for the incentive or deterrent effect
of the provision in question, its repeal and the substitution of a
Single Tax on Income would sacrifice important social objectives.
A computation of effective tax rates that is based solely on
income encourages this sacrifice of values by narrowing the
reader's angle of vision.
VII. ALLOCATION OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES
The fairness of a tax system cannot be judged without
taking account of the governmental benefits it makes possible.
From an ethical perspective, a tax levied to finance welfare
payments is not the same as an identical tax to build a municipal
polo field. Thus, a computation of effective tax rates is ethically
neutral, when viewed in isolation; what counts is fiscal, rather
than tax, fairness. Recognizing this, economists and other social
analysts have endeavored to allocate the benefits of public ex-
penditures to the citizenry, classified by income class. The obj'ec-
tive is a distribution of both benefits and burdens, permitting
each income group's benefits to be compared with its taxes in a
consolidated display of the global incidence of the nation's fiscal
system.59
But any such allocation of governmental benefits encounters
a familiar problem in political economy-the absence of a free
market to establish the citizen's own evaluation of benefits he
derives from governmental expenditures. Without a .toll gate to
exclude free loaders from public education, highways, or other
social goods and services, we do not know what any citizen or
11 Herriot & Miller, Changes, supra note 11. For conceptual difficulties in such
allocations, see Aaron & McGuire, Public Goods and Income Distribution, 38 ECONOME-rRICA,
Nov. 1970, at 907; Weisbrod, Income Redistribution Effects and Benefit Cost Analysis, in
PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 177 (S. Chase ed. 1968); C. GALVIN & B.
BITTKER, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? 48-54 (1969).
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group of citizens would have been willing to pay for these
benefits, or how much they have consumed. If it were possible to
deaden the free-loader instinct with a truth serum, we could
ascertain what a particular public good is worth to each user.
Pending this improvement in medical technology, analysts who
allocate governmental expenditures by income class must choose
from a range of plausible assumptions that is unfortunately even
broader than the spectrum used to allocate the tax burden.
A recent allocation divided the $215 billion of aggregate
public expenditures for 1968 into two groups: those for which "a
reasonable allocation series" was thought to exist, and those that
could be allocated only by adopting one of several "arbitrary
assumptions. °60 For the latter group, consisting of national de-
fense and related expenditures amounting to $129 billion or 60
percent of the total, the alternative assumptions were that the
allocation should be per capita, proportional to income, or pro-
portional to wealth. As might be expected, the assumption cho-
sen exerts enormous leverage on the result. Allocating these
expenditures by wealth assigns almost 27 percent to persons with
$50,000 of adjusted money income or more, while a per capita
allocation credits them with only 0.6 percent. For taxpayers at
the bottom of the income spectrum (under $2,000 of adjusted
money income), on the other hand, a per capita allocation credits
them with almost 13 percent of these expenditures while an
assignment by income gives them only 1 percent.
But there is a wide choice of alternatives not only in allocat-
ing the benefits of expenditures for national defense and the
like, but also when expenditures for education, health and social
welfare are involved. The study just described treated these
items, which amounted to 40 percent of the total, as assignable to
individuals on the basis of direct personal participation in the
relevant programs. Thus, expenditures for education were as-
signed to families with children in public schools and colleges,
federal aid to hospitals was allocated to persons using veterans'
and other government hospitals, and welfare and social security
payments were assigned to their recipients. But it would be
entirely reasonable to assign these expenditures, at least in part,
to persons other than those who participate directly in the
programs in question, just as the cost of maintaining the Naval
War College is not allocated to the officers who attend the
courses. Some, indeed, may believe that expenditures for social
60 Herriot & Miller, Changes, supra note 1I.
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welfare are merely premiums paid by those who are well-off for
insurance against civil disorder and that what the poor receive is
either an incidental externality or a "public bad" rather than a
"public good" because it saps their enthusiasm for social change.
Even if one rejects this view as too cynical or class-oriented, there
is merit in the theory that the quality of everyone's life is
enhanced by public education, and that the rich are benefited if
the poor do not have to sleep in the streets. 61 To divide these
expenditures between direct participants in the programs and
others who derive indirect benefits, one must adopt an arbitrary
formula; but to disregard the indirect benefits is equally arbi-
trary.
By an irony of timing, the concept of a consolidated mea-
sure of fiscal fairness had barely become an accepted tool of
analysis when a crucial assumption of such computations came
under heavy fire. Disenchantment with GNP as a measure of
economic welfare carries with it a refusal to regard aggregate
governmental expenditures as synonymous with benefits. If
some expenditures produce "bads" rather than "goods," should
this not be recognized before passing judgment on the fiscal
system's fairness? The pioneering Tobin-Nordhaus "Measure of
Economic Welfare" excludes "regrettable expenses" such as the
cost of national defense, adjusts for the "disamenities of urbani-
zation," and makes other allowances for adverse and neutral
economic costs in measuring economic well-being. 62 Though
acknowledged by its authors to be "primitive and experimental,"
this effort to come to grips with GNP's anti-growth critics carries
an interesting implication for the measurement of fiscal fairness,
viz., that similar adjustments should be made in computing the
benefits of governmental expenditures before allocating them by
income classes. Indeed, the concept of income itself could be
profitably reexamined in the light of the Tobin-Nordhaus
analysis of economic welfare.
Adjustments of this type, it hardly needs saying, entail a host
of judgments before the computer can be programmed. Once
again, we find that a balance sheet of government benefits and
burdens consists of numbers whose precision belies the debatable
social and political judgments on which the computation rests.
Behind the computer, there is always a moral philosopher.
"1 This fact underlies efforts to describe a "pareto-optimal" distribution of income.
See Brennan & Walsh, Pareto-Optimal Redistribution Reconsidered, 1 PUB. FiN. Q. #147
(1973) & articles cited.
"I Nordhaus & Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, in ECONOMIc GROWTH (Natl Bureau of
Econ. Research, Colloquium III, VKOL. V, 1972).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Judgments about equity in the tax system ultimately depend
on deep-seated political and philosophical convictions, which in
turn are linked in a complex fashion with economic interests.
The most that can be expected of the tax analyst is a description
of the way the tax burden is allocated among income or other
relevant classes. The analyst's role begins with a recognition that
the statutory rate schedule tells us little about the actual distribu-
tion of the tax burden. This insight is illustrated by the original
McGovern tax credit plan, which taxed all income at the same
nominal rate, but then reached a progressive result by allowing a
per capita credit against this hypothetical tax liability. As we
explored the techniques used by the analyst to compare the
nominal and effective tax rates, however, it became painfully
clear that no table or graph is better than its footnotes, and that
the footnotes are almost always replete with debatable assump-
tions. As a result, the existence of a gap between the nominal
and effective rates is a neutral bit of information, which should
lead to a value judgment only if the hypothetical base used by
the analyst in computing the effective rates is regarded by the
informed citizen as preferable to the statutory tax base to which
the nominal rates are applied. Even then, a gap that would be
offensive if judged solely by the citizen's equity criterion may be
salvaged if, in his view, it advances a social or economic objective
that he prizes, such as low-cost housing, pollution control or
economic growth.
A careful reading of the footnotes to a table of tax burdens
will do more than expose its threshold assumptions. It will also
disclose other reasons why the naked statistics may be a deficient
foundation for policy recommendations. First, the statistics
rarely if ever reflect the troublesome fact that pre-tax income is
affected in real but obscure ways by the tax system. It is mislead-
ing, for example, to portray tax-exempt interest as subject to a
zero effective rate if the yield on state and municipal bonds is
lower than the yield on taxable securities of comparable quality.
For policy purposes, it would often be more realistic to regard
-the investor as subject to an implicit tax; and the fact that it is
difficult to estimate the appropriate amount does not improve
the quality of tax-burden computations that treat it as zero, but
rather illustrates one of their deficiencies. Of more global
significance, and even more difficult to assess, is the fact that the
pre-tax income of all taxpayers is affected by the tax system, but
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that their ability to shift the burden may vary with their income
level, occupation, age and other characteristics. Judgments about
equity would be badly undermined if it turned out that the tax
burden of substantial groups of taxpayers have been
neutralized-or accentuated-by changes in their pre-tax in-
come. This possibility may be minimized by neoclassical
economic theory, but it cannot be excluded.
Moreover, when the tax analyst endeavors to provide a
comprehensive portrait of the distribution of all taxes, rather
than to analyze the income tax in isolation, the problem of
shifting is even more acute. If the theorist adopts the reasonable
tactic of providing alternative computations, each based on a
different set of economic assumptions, the reader must make his
own selection, a task for which his qualifications may be minimal.
Finally, an ethical judgment about the tax burden can hardly
disregard governmental expenditures financed by the tax system
in question. One wants to know who benefits before deciding
who should pay. Here again, however, the analyst can supply a
framework, but the statistics inserted in it depend on the prem-
ises; and the wide range of plausible alternatives can lead to
widely divergent social judgments about the combined effect of
taxes and governmental expenditures.
19741
